“Then when they are fifty years old they shall retire from the work force and not serve any more.” (BeMidbar 8:25)
The members of Shevet
Leyve – the Leveyim – were
assigned to assist the Kohanim. They had various responsibilities. These included singing in the Mishcan and guarding it from all ritual
impurity. Our pasuk indicates that the Leveyim
were required to retire from their responsibilities upon reaching the age of
fifty.
What responsibilities could the Leyve no longer perform when reaching the age of fifty? In order to answer this question, we must be
aware of an important detail in the transport of the Mishcan. How was the Mishcan transported? Most of the Mishcan was transported by wagon.
However, the most sacred components were carried directly by the Leveyim – specifically, by the member of
the family of Kahat. These components
included the altars, the Shulchan, Menorah, and the Aron.
Rashi explains that a Leyve reaching the age of fifty was only disqualified from direct
carrying. He could not participate in
the transport of the Aron and those
components that were carried directly by the Leveyim. His age implied
declining strength. This rendered him
unfit for this physically challenging task.
However, he still participated in other tasks performed by the Leveyim. He sang in the Mishcan,
opened and closed the entrances, and assisted in loading the wagons used to
transport other portions of the Mishcan.[1]
Nachmanides differs with Rashi. He maintains that, upon reaching the age of
fifty, the Leyve was also
disqualified from participating in the songs of the Mishcan.[2] Nachmanides, in his commentary on
Maimonides’ Sefer HaMitzvot, offers an interesting explanation for his
position. He explains that, once the Leyve reached the age of fifty, he was
no longer fit to carry heavy burdens.
In order to avoid confusion, he was also disqualified from participating
in song. Participation in song would
create the impression that the elder
Leyve was fit for all service – even carrying portions of the Mishcan.[3] In other words, age rendered the Leyve fundamentally unfit for carrying
heavy burdens. His disqualification
from participating in the song of the Temple was the result of a secondary
consideration. He was restricted from
song in order to avoid confusion.
The Torah is composed of 613 – Taryag – mitzvot. Should this restriction upon the Leyve be included within the 613 mitzvot? The answer depends on the criteria for including a command among Taryag.
Taryag is a permanent
system. It applies in all
generations. Therefore, one of the
criteria for inclusion in Taryag is
that the commandment must not be fixed to a particular historical moment or
circumstance. For example, Hashem gave
Bnai Yisrael various commandments in preparation for Revelation on Sinai. One of these was that the people could not
approach or ascend the mountain. These
instructions only applied during the period of Revelation. These restrictions cannot be counted as
elements of Taryag.[4] Therefore, in order to answer our question
regarding this restriction on the Leyve,
we must ask another question. Does this
restriction apply in all generations, or was this restriction only relevant during
the sojourn in the wilderness?
Halachot Gedolot includes the restriction upon the Leyve’s service among the Taryag Mitzvot. Apparently, he maintains that this
restriction applies in all generations.
Maimonides objects. He argues
that this restriction only applied during a specific historical period. Therefore, it is not appropriate to include
this restriction within Taryag.[5]
Nachmanides supports the opinion of Halachot
Gedolot. However, before we consider
Nachmanides’ argument, we must consider two related issues.
First, as we have explained, during the sojourn in
the wilderness, the Mishcan was
transported on a regular basis. Once
Bnai Yisrael entered the land of Israel, this changed. At first, the Mishcan was placed at a permanent location. Later, the Bait HaMikdash in Yerushalayim
replaced the Mishcan. In other words, the Mishcan was no longer regularly transported in its entirety, or
even partially. However, the Aron was moved on a few occasions. One of these occasions was the transfer of
the Aron to Yerushalayim. King David arranged for this operation.
Maimonides acknowledges that there is a mitzvah that regulates the transport of
the Aron. This mitzvah is
included in Taryag. It stipulates that the Aron must be carried directly.
It cannot be transported by wagon or some other conveyance.[6]
Second, in the wilderness, the Leveyim were responsible for the transport of the Aron.
However, according to Maimonides, this is no longer the case. The Kohanim
are now responsible for this task. No
other member of Shevet Leyve can
perform this task. Maimonides explains
that during the period of the sojourn in the wilderness, there were few Kohanim. It was not feasible to charge this small group with this
responsibility. Therefore, the task of
transporting the Aron was assigned to
the Leveyim. However, when the number of Kohanim increased, this task was
permanently assigned to the Kohanim.[7]
We can now understand Nachmanides’ objection to
Maimonides’ position. Maimonides
maintains that the restriction upon the Leveyim’s
service beyond the age of fifty is not one of the Taryag Mitzvot. Nachmanides
raises an obvious objection. The
restriction upon the Leyve who
reaches the age of fifty against carrying the Mishcan was a commandment during the sojourn in the
wilderness. It was, essentially, a
parameter. It defined who was fit and
who was disqualified from performing this task. This restriction dictated that one over the age of fifty was not
permitted to directly carry any component of the Mishcan – including the Aron. The task of carrying one component of the Mishcan, the Aron, is a mitzvah
counted among Taryag. It is reasonable that the parameter of who
is qualified and who is disqualified from performance of this task should
remain in force. True, the restriction
should now apply to the Kohanim and
not the Leveyim. Nonetheless, the restriction should continue
to be regarded as a mitzvah that
defines a fundamental parameter regarding the transport of the Mishcan.[8] It should also be noted that Maimonides does
not only refuse to count this parameter as a mitzvah. He does not even
regard this parameter as in force. It
simply no longer applies!
How can we explain this dispute between Maimonides
and Nachmanides? It seems that
Maimonides and Nachmanides argue over the fundamental nature of the restriction
upon the Leyve. There are two ways to understand this
restriction. One approach is that this
restriction is a law governing the transport of the Aron or Mishcan. The transport of the Aron requires physical strength.
The job demands a robust person.
A person who is over the age of fifty is simply not assumed capable of
performing this duty. In other words,
this is not a law directly governing the functions of the Leyve. It is a law
regarding the transport of the Mishcan. The second approach is that the Leveyim were assigned a number of
tasks. One of the most important was
the transport of the Mishcan or Aron.
If a person could no longer fulfill this difficult task, he was
disqualified from serving as a Leyve. In other words, this law governs the
qualifications for serving as a Leyve.
Nachmanides maintains that this law is merely a
restriction in who can carry the Aron. Therefore, as long as there is a mitzvah to transport the Aron, this restriction continues to
function. It deserves to be counted
among Taryag.
Maimonides disagrees. He maintains that the restriction placed upon the Leyve in the wilderness was far more
than a parameter defining whom could carry the Mishcan and Aron. The law in the wilderness defined who was
included and counted among the Leveyim,
and who was not completely included.
The responsibility for transporting the Aron and Mishcan was a
fundamental aspect of the Leyve’s
job. A Leyve that could no longer perform this task could not be
completely counted as a Leyve.
We can now respond to Nachmanides’ objection to
Maimonides’ position. The age
restriction that applied to the Leyve was only reasonable because the task of
transporting the Mishcan was a
fundamental aspect of his job. He could
not perform this task. Therefore, he
could not be completely counted among his brethren. Maimonides maintains that this responsibility was transferred to
the Kohanim. Therefore, it is no longer part of the Leyve’s job description. It follows that the inability of the Leyve to perform this task should no
longer disqualify the Leyve. This task is no longer his
responsibility. His fitness can no
longer be evaluated on the basis of his ability to carry heavy burdens.
The responsibility for carrying the Aron has been transferred to the Kohen.
However, this is a very minor aspect of the Kohen’s role. It is not
reasonable to disqualify a Kohen from
being counted among his brethren because he cannot perform this task. The task is not fundamental to the role of Kohen.
In short, according to Maimonides, a law that
disqualifies a Leyve of Kohen on the basis of advanced age is no
longer feasible. It presumes that the
person’s primary role is impacted by age.
This is no longer the case with the
Leyve. He has been relieved of his
responsibility to carry the Mishcan
or Aron. This is also not the case with the Kohen. Albeit that he is
responsible for transporting the Aron,
this is a minor aspect of his job.
[1] Rabbaynu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Sefer BeMidbar 8:25.
[2] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Sefer BeMidbar 8:25.
[3] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Critique on Maimonides’ Sefer HaMitzvot, Third Principle.
[4] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Sefer HaMitzvot, Third Principle.
[5] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Sefer HaMitzvot, Third Principle.
[6] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Sefer HaMitzvot, Mitzvat Aseh 34.
[7] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Sefer HaMitzvot, Mitzvat Aseh 34.
[8] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Critique on Maimonides’ Sefer HaMitzvot, Third Principle.