“And Miryam and Aharon spoke about Moshe regarding
the beautiful woman he had married – for he had married a beautiful woman.” (BeMidbar 12:1)
One of the most popular Torah topics is lashon hara
– speaking negatively about another person.
It seems that it is universally recognized that this behavior is
prohibited by the Torah in the strongest terms. Yet, recognition of the fact that the behavior is unequivocally
prohibited seems to have little impact on the prevalence of the behavior. This suggests that we may need some guidance
in dealing with the urge to speak and participate in lashon hara. In this week’s Thoughts we will discuss the
nature of the prohibition against lashon hara and hopefully this discussion
will provide a useful insight in dealing with this behavior.
The above pasuk tells us that Miryam and Aharon
spoke about their brother Moshe. The
Torah does not provide many details regarding the specific conversation that
took place between Moshe and Aharon. But our Sages provide some details. They explain that Miryam initiated the conversation. Aharon participated by listening. Miryam told Aharon that she understood from
Moshe’s wife – Tziporah – that Moshe was not longer intimate with her.[1] Miryam and Aharon found this
astounding. They too were
prophets. Yet, they had not abandoned
intimacy with their spouses.[2] By engaging in this conversation, Miryam and
Aharon violated the prohibition of lashon hara – speaking in a derogatory
manner about another person.
The Torah explains that as a result of this sin,
Miryam was stricken with tzara’at.
Tzara’at is a skin disease described in Sefer VaYikra. From the account in Sefer VaYikra it is
apparent that tzara’at is a punishment.
However, it is not clear from that account what sin precipitates this
punishment. Based on this incident in
our parasha, it is clear that lashon hara is one of the sins that result in
tzara’at.
The connection between tzara’at and lashon hara is
also indicated by another set of passages.
In Sefer Devarim (Devarim 24:8-9) the Torah tells us to carefully follow
the directions of the Kohen in the diagnosis and treatment of tzara’at. Then the Torah admonishes us to remember the
incident of Miryam.[3] According to our Sages, the message is that
to avoid tzara’at we must refrain from the behavior of Miryam. In other words, one must avoid lashon hara.[4]
All behaviors that are prohibited or required by the
Torah are included in one of the 613 mitzvot.
What mitzvah prohibits speaking lashon hara? In order to answer this question, we must first define our
terms.
Maimonides in his code of Halacha – the Mishne Torah
– in Hilchot Dey’ot explains that lashon hara is one type of prohibited
speech. It is not the only form or
speech about others that is prohibited.
There are three types of speech that are prohibited. The first is rechilut. This is gossip. It need not be negative.
It is merely the act of discussing someone’s affairs with a third
party. Lashon hara is a special case of
rechilut. It is negative gossip –
speaking in a disparaging manner about someone. However, there is one interesting qualification that must be met. Lashon hara involves imparting disparaging
information that is true. Lashon hara
does not include making up outright lies.
Spreading disparaging, false rumors is motzi shem ra. In short, gossip
is rechilut; lashon hara is speaking about someone in a disparaging manner –
albeit that the statement is true.
Spreading false, disparaging rumors is motzi shem ra.[5]
We can now identify the mitzvah violated by lashon
hara. According to Maimonides no
mitzvah specifically prohibits lashon hara.
Instead, the Torah prohibits rechilut and this includes the special case
of lashon hara.
Nachmanides disagrees with Maimonides. He insists that there is a specific mitzvah
prohibiting lashon hara. It is derived
from our parasha and the Torah’s latter admonition – in Sefer Devarim – to
guard ourselves from tzara’at and to remember this experience of Miryam.
Nachmanides argues that our Sages regarded lashon
hara as a serious sin. They went so far
as to compare lashon hara to the spilling of blood.[6] It is incomprehensible that there is no
specific command prohibiting the behavior!
He adds that the Torah prescribes a very serious punishment to lashon
hara – tzara’at. We would expect that
this serious consequence would be in response to the violation of a specific
commandment. Based on these considerations,
Nachmanides argues that lashon hara is prohibited by a specific commandment. It is either a negative commandment
communicated in the admonition to avoid tzara’at or a positive command
contained in the admonition to remember the experience of Miryam.[7]
In summary, Maimonides and Nachmanides agree that
lashon hara is prohibited. However,
according to Maimonides, it is included in the general mitzvah prohibiting
gossip. Nachmanides insists that there
is a separate mitzvah that specifically prohibits lashon hara.
Let us take a moment to understand the basis of this
argument. Each position seems to have
its merit. It seems that Nachmanides’
argument is rather compelling. Lashon
hara is a serious sin. Does it not make
sense that it deserves its own mitzvah?
How might Maimonides respond to this issue? However Maimonides’ position is also reasonable. Maimonides maintains that lashon hara is a
form of gossip and is included in the general prohibition against gossip. What is so objectionable to including the
prohibition against lashon hara in the more general mitzvah prohibiting
rechilut?
It is clear that the Nachmanides’ basic premise is
that lashon hara must be assessed in view of the damage and hurt that it
causes. Our Sages compare the lashon
hara to the spilling of blood. Clearly, they are evaluating lashon hara from the
perspective of the damage it causes.
From this perspective it does not make sense to compare lashon hara to
innocent gossip. Gossip is
inappropriate. But from the perspective
of damage it is a very different activity than lashon hara. Unlike gossip, lashon hara is an explicit
attack against a person’s reputation.
It is not appropriate to include the damaging behavior of lashon hara in
the general mitzvah prohibiting senseless gossip. Therefore, Nachmanides argues that lashon hara deserves its own mitzvah
and should not be included in the general prohibition against rechilut.
So, why does Maimonides include lashon hara within
the mitzvah prohibiting rechilut? It is
important to note that Maimonides includes the laws of rechilut in the Hilchot
Dayot section of the Mishne Torah. What
is the subject matter of Hilchot Dayot?
In this section of the Mishne Torah, Maimonides outlines the perimeters
of general emotional and physical health.
The inclusion of the mitzvah prohibiting rechilut in this section
implies that engaging in gossip represents a personally destructive
behavior. The person that engages in
gossip is undermining his or her own emotional well being. From this perspective it is appropriate to
include lashon hara within the mitzvah prohibiting all forms of gossip. All of these forms of gossip cause harm to
one’s own emotional well being.
We can now understand the dispute between
Nachmanides and Maimonides. According
to Nachmanides, the essential aspect of lashon hara is the harm caused to
others. Therefore, lashon hara cannot
be included in the general mitzvah prohibiting gossip. Maimonides maintains that essential
component of lashon hara is the harm caused to oneself. From this perspective it is appropriate to
include lashon hara in the general mitzvah prohibiting rechilut.
However, it must be noted that Maimonides does
acknowledge that lashon hara is a special case of rechilut. This acknowledgement implies that the harm
caused by lashon hara to one’s personal well being is somewhat different from
the harm associated with general rechilut.
However, it is not clear from Maimonides’ comments exactly wherein the
difference lies.
If we pursue this issue we may discover that
Maimonides’ position provides an essential insight into the behavior of lashon
hara. We notice that despite the
widespread desire to curtail our engagement in lashon hara, this determination
does not easily translate into an actual change in behavior. Why is this behavior so difficult to modify
and correct? Part of the answer may lie
in the traditional method used to address the problem. We notice that the most common method for
addressing the problem of lashon hara is to read more about the gravity of the
sin. Books about lashon hara are Judaic
best sellers. But it seems that in the
long-run learning more about the specific laws of lashon hara and the gravity
of the sin has limited impact on the behavior.
In fact this outcome is not surprising. If a person
wants to change ones eating habits does one seriously think that reading diet
books will foster this change? One who
wishes to be less of a couch potato will probably not meet this challenge
simply by reading about exercise. This
reading may provide temporary inspiration.
But in the long run this approach does not usually lead to permanent
results.
Instead one must identify and address the root
source of the behavior. In the case of
eating one must discover why one overeats.
What is the attraction? What
function is food serving in the person’s life?
It makes sense that the same is required to
effectively approach to problem of lashon hara. What causes us to engage in this behavior? Our Sages provide an amazing insight into
this issue. They tell us the when we
depreciate others we are really reflecting upon our own inadequacies.[8] In other words, we speak about others in
order to deflect our attention – or the attention of others – from our own
insecurities, failing and faults.
Let us consider this assertion more closely. We can all acknowledge that one of the
greatest challenges we face in achieving personal growth is the need to
critically evaluate our own attitudes and behaviors. The more deep-set and behavior or attitude, the more difficult it
is to recognize and acknowledge. But
this does not mean that we are not in some sense aware or our personal
faults. We are frustrated with these
imperfections and yet, we are unwilling to completely acknowledge them and
confront them. How do we deal with this
frustration? Our Sages are suggesting
that we self-medicate. We escape our
frustration by transferring our attention to the shortcoming of others. Rather than focus on ourselves, we change
the focus of our attention to the other person. We evaluate that person and dissect the person’s behaviors and
attitudes with the precision that we should direct towards the more painful and
difficult task of introspection.
This is the reason the Maimonides regards rechilut
as a behavior that undermines our own personal health. We are diverting our attention from
ourselves and attaching it to another person. Lashon hara is an extreme
manifestation of this mechanism. Gossip
is a simple diversion. In speaking
lashon hara we are actually aware – at some level – of a personal
deficiency. But rather than acknowledging
our personal shortcoming, we focus our attention on this failing as manifested
in someone else. In this manner, we
actually engage in denial of our own faults.
This insight of our Sages suggests an approach to
dealing with the urge to speak and participate in lashon hara and
rechilut. The urge is apparently,
motivated by the presence of an awareness of some personal failing. But this awareness is evokes an unhealthy
response. We transfer our focus from
ourselves to the other person. If this
is correct, then each time we feel the urge to participate in lashon hara or
rechilut, we need to respond with a question.
What is bothering me about myself?
What and I trying to avoid considering?
Rather than allowing our attention to be diverted, we need to sharpen
our focus on ourselves and allow for a moment of introspection.
This is not an easy solution to apply. But it seems to respond to the fundamental
motivations behind lashon hara and rechilut.
Perhaps, if we keep our Sages insight in mind, we will be better able to
overcome the urge to participate in lashon hara and rechilut.
[1] Rabbaynu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary
on Sefer BeMidbar 12:1.
[2] Rabbaynu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary
on Sefer BeMidbar 12:2.
[3] Sefer Devarim 24:8-9.
[4] Rabbaynu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary
on Sefer Devarim 24:9.
[5] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Mishne
Torah, Hilchot Dey’ot 7:1-2.
[6] Mesechet Erechim 15b.
[7] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary
on Sefer Devarim 24:9.
[8] Mesechet Kedushin 70b.