Rabbi Bernard Fox
“And Moshe spoke to the heads of the tribes saying, “This is the matter that Hashem commanded” (BeMidbar 30:2)
This pasuk
introduces the most comprehensive discussion in the Torah of the laws governing
vows. What is a vow? A vow is a means by which a person creates a
personal obligation or restriction. One
reason a person makes a vow is to obligate oneself to offer a sacrifice. This person would verbalize a commitment to
bring an Olah sacrifice. Once this commitment is verbalized as a vow,
the person is obligated to bring the offering.
Failure to bring the offering is a violation of a binding Torah obligation.
A person might also make a vow to donate a certain
sum to charity. However, vows can also
relate to issues that are more mundane.
A person eager to control one’s diet might make a vow to eat at least
one vegetable each day.
A vow can also take the form of a restriction. A person can vow to refrain from eating ice
cream for a specific period of time.
This person is not permitted to eat ice cream. In fact, for this person, ice cream is no different than the
other foods prohibited by the Torah.
Just as we are prohibited from eating forbidden fats, this person is
subject to an additional restriction. This
individual, because of the vow, cannot consume ice cream.
A vow is a serious commitment. The Torah requires strict adherence to
vows. Therefore, the Sages discouraged
making frivolous vows. This is because
the Sages were concerned that a person may violate a vow. The best way to assure that a vow is not
violated is not to make the vow in the first instance.
Our parasha
focuses on a specific aspect of the laws governing vows. The Torah explains that the vows of certain
individuals are subject to reversal. In
other words, if one of these individuals makes a vow, this vow can be reversed
by another party. Who are these
individuals? Who is empowered with the
authority to overturn their vows? Under
what circumstances can this authority be exercised?
The Torah explains that a father can reverse his
unwed daughter’s vow. A husband can
overturn the vow of his wife. This
authority does not extend to all vows.
The husband can only overturn vows that affect him. However, if the wife makes a vow that affects
no person other than herself, the husband cannot reverse the vow. He does not have authority over such vows.[1]
Our parasha
delineates various perimeters of this authority. For example, the father or husband can only overturn a vow by
acting on the same day that he becomes aware of the vow. Another restriction on this authority is
that a father can only nullify the vow of a daughter that has not completely
reached her majority. However, once the
daughter is a complete adult, the father’s authority lapses.
Our pasuk
indicates that Moshe explained these laws to the heads of the tribes – the shevatim. Why did Moshe address the heads of the shevatim and not all the nation?
There are various responses to this question. Rashi rejects the very premise of the question. He explains that Moshe actually announced
the material concerning vows to the entire nation. The intent of the pasuk
is to indicate that Moshe first taught the material to the princes of the shevatim. After instructing the leaders, he taught the material to the
nation. Rashi also contends that this
process was not specific to this material.
Moshe followed this process in teaching all portions of the Torah. First, he addressed the princes and,
afterwards, he again taught the material to the nation.[2] This does leave one question. Why does the Torah, in this instance,
mention the preferential treatment afforded the princes? According to Rashi, these leaders were
consistently provided with the initial communication of the laws. However, specifically in this instance the
Torah reveals this process!
Nachmanides disagrees with Rashi. He maintains that the Torah is describing an
unique event. In general, Moshe taught
the mitzvot to the entire
nation. However, this mitzvah was revealed to the
princes. It was not initially revealed
to the entire nation. Why is this mitzvah special? Nachmanides offers a number of
possibilities. One is that the princes
have a unique role in regard to vows.
The laws of vows were revealed to the princes as an indication of their
special role and responsibility in this regard. What is this singular role and responsibility?
As has been explained, the Torah requires that we
adhere to our vows. A person cannot
make a vow, then decide that it was ill considered, and disregard it. Perhaps, this person should not have made
the vow. Nonetheless, the vow must be
respected. However, there is a means of
release from a vow. An expert scholar
or a court can release a person from a vow.
The person must show cause. Halacha delineates the criteria for such
a release.
Nachmanides explains that this unique role and
responsibility afforded the scholars and courts is not explicitly stated
anywhere in the Torah. However, it is
alluded to in our pasuk. The princes represented the scholars and
judges. In speaking to the princes,
Moshe communicated that these princes and the scholars and courts that would
exist in the future have responsibility for vows. What is this responsibility?
They are empowered to release a person from a vow.[3]
Rashi utilizes this same concept to resolve the
difficulty engendered by his explanation of our passage. Rashi explains that Moshe regularly revealed
the commandments to the princes prior to the nation. This detail is mentioned in our parasha as an allusion to the unique role of the judges and
scholars in regard to vows. They are
endowed with the right to release a person from a vow.
In summary, there are two means by which the binding
power of a vow can be nullified. A
husband or father can reverse the vow.
The court can release the person from the vow.
There are many differences between these two
processes. However, there is one
distinction that the commentaries note is particularly significant. The father or husband does not require the
consent of the wife of daughter. He can
act unilaterally. In other words, even
if the daughter wishes the vow to be binding, the father may reverse it. The same is true of the husband's authority
in regard to his wife’s vow. The courts
do not have this ability. The court
cannot act unilaterally. The court does
not even initiate the process. Instead,
a person wishing release from a vow must petition the court. The court can only act in response to the
request of the person seeking release.
This seems to be an odd arrangement. We would expect the opposite. We would expect a court of law to have
greater authority than a lay person would.
Yet, the opposite is true. A
father or husband has greater authority over vows that the most elevated court
of the nation! What is the reason for
this paradoxical arrangement? More
importantly, what does this arrangement reveal about the natures of these
processes?
The commentaries suggest an important concept that
explains this distinction. What is the
legal basis for the authority of the father and husband? Sforno contends that the Torah actually
endows the father and husband with authority over the vows of a daughter or
wife. As head of the household, the
father or husband has the authority to reverse these vows.[4]
What is the legal basis for the license of the
courts? Nachmanides addresses this
issue. His comments are not completely
clear. He seems to maintain that the
Torah does not require our unqualified adherence to our vows. However, we are required to treat a vow as a
serious commitment. It cannot be
regarded lightly. This means that,
given sufficient grounds, a vow can be rescinded. If these grounds exist and the vow is rescinded after careful
analysis of these grounds, then the vow has not been disregarded. It has not been treated lightly. The role of the court is to conduct this
analysis. The court validates the cause
presented by the petitioner for nullification of the vow.[5]
This distinction explains the paradox outlined
above. Why does the father or husband
have greater authority over vows than the courts? The father or husband actually has authority over a daughter or
wife's vow. As a result, he can
unilaterally overturn these vows. The
courts do not have actual authority.
They cannot unilaterally release a person from a vow. Instead, the court merely evaluates the
credibility of the reasons provided by the petitioner for release from a vow. The person who made the vow presents an
argument for release from the vow. The
court analyzes this argument and validates its credibility. This process can only take place through the
person who made the vow petitioning the court.
It is impossible for the court to act without the initiation of the
person who made the vow.
“Command Bnai Yisrael and say to them, “When you come to the land of Canaan, this is the land within the borders of the land of Canaan that shall be your hereditary territory.” (BeMidbar 34:2)
Hashem describes to Moshe the borders of the land of
Israel. This land will be divided into
portions and distributed among the tribes.
Rashi explains that these boundaries are very important in halacha. Various mitzvot only
apply in the land of Israel. Therefore,
any territory outside of the borders is exempt from these commandments.[6]
It must be noted this description of the boundaries
indicates that the eastern border is the Jordan River. This is difficult to explain. The tribes of Reuven, Gad, and half of the
tribe of Menashe settled in the territory conquered from Sichon and Og. In general, any land conquered by the nation
is considered, in halacha, to be part
of the land of Israel.[7]
This land was situated on the eastern side of the Jordan. The proper eastern border should be the
eastern boundary of this territory!
Rav Moshe Feinstein Ztl explains that there is a basic difference between the land of
Israel west of the Jordan and the territory to the east. The land to the west was promised to Avraham
and the forefathers. It was destined to
be conquered and become the land of Israel.
The land of Sichon and Og was not included in this covenant. It was not predetermined that this land
should become part of the land of Israel.[8]
This distinction can provide a possible answer to
our question. Moshe had awarded the
land of Sichon and Og to Reuven, Gad, and half of Menashe. However, he had stipulated a condition. This land would become their portion after
they had conquered the territory west of the Jordan. Moshe had required that first the land of the covenant must be
captured. Then, this additional land
could become part of the land of Israel.
The sanctity of the land of Sichon and Og was suspended until the land
of the covenant was possessed.
Now, the description of the boundaries can be
explained. Hashem specifically
described the borders of the land of the covenant. This is the land that must first be sanctified. Once this is accomplished, the land of
Sichon and Og can be possessed and sanctified.
[1] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Mishne Torah, Hilchot Nedarim 12:1. (See Radvaz for other opinions).
[2] Rabbaynu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Sefer BeMidbar 30:2.
[3] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Sefer BeMidbar 30:2.
[4] Rabbaynu Ovadia Sforno, Commentary on Sefer BeMidbar 30:2
[5] See Rabbaynu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Sefer BeMidbar 30:2.
[6] Rabbaynu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Sefer BeMidbar 34:2
[7] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Mishne Torah, Hilchot Terumot 1:2.
[8] Rav Moshe Feinstein, Derash Moshe, Sefer BeMidbar 32:29.