“No meal
offering that you sacrifice to the Lord shall be made [out of anything]
leavened. For you shall not cause to [go up in] smoke any leavening or any
honey, [as] a fire offering to Hashem.”
(VaYikra
2:11)
The Torah contains six-hundred thirteen commandments. All of the various laws and instructions contained in the Torah can be categorized within this system of six hundred thirteen commandments – Taryag mitzvot. However, although we know that all of the laws of the Torah can be divided into and among the Taryag mitzvot, the Torah does not contain an enumeration of the specific commandments.
Various authorities have developed lists of the
Taryag mitzvot. Perhaps the most well
known and most often quoted is the list developed by Maimonides. Maimonides wrote a work devoted to this
issue –Sefer HaMitzvot. In this work,
Maimonides presents his list of commandments with a brief description of
each. In addition, the list is preceded
by an exhaustive explanation of the means by which Maimonides came to his
conclusions.
Although, Maimonides’ list is the most well-known
and often quoted, it is likely that of the works that discuss the Taryag
mitzvot the one most read is Sefer HaChinuch.
The authorship of the work is somewhat of a mystery. The author does not provide biographical
information and the work contains few hints to the author’s identity. The author only identifies himself as Aharon
HaLeyve of Barcelona. It is generally
assumed that he was a student of Nachmanides.
Despite this close association with Nachmanides, the
author of Sefer HaChinuch closely follows Maimonides’ position regarding the
identity of the six-hundred thirteen commandments. In area in which his teacher disagrees with Maimonides, he will
sometimes quote Nachmanides’ dissention.
Sefer HaChinuch’s discussion of each commandment
consists of five components:
Definition of the commandment.
A brief discussion of some of the fundamental laws
included in the commandment.
An explanation of the reason for the commandment.
A list of the general areas of discussion related to
the commandment and the location of the Talmudic discussion of these areas.
A summary of to whom the commandment applies, when
it applies, and the consequences for its violation.
The author’s reasons for including most of these
elements in his discussion of each commandment are self-evident. He is providing the reader with a brief, yet
meaningful description of the commandment and citing the sources to be
consulted for further study. However,
the reason for one component is not clear.
Why does the author include a reason, or rationale, for each
commandment?
Furthermore, it is sometimes very difficult to
determine the reason for a commandment.
In some instances the reason is self-evident. We do not require the Torah to provide us with an explanation for
the commandment prohibiting murder. In
some cases, the Torah provides an explanation for the commandment. The Torah tells us that we observe Shabbat
in order to recall creation and our redemption from Egypt. However, in many instances, the rationale
for the commandment is not self-evident and the Torah does not provide any hint
to the reason for the commandment. In
these instances, the author of Sefer HaChinuch relies upon sources in Talmud
and midrash, and his own reasoning, to develop a plausible rationale for the
commandment. But this raises a
question: Why suggest a rationale for each commandment if, in some cases, there
is no clear rationale offered by the Torah?
The passage above provides an illustration of the
dilemma that sometimes confronts Sefer HaChinuch. The passage prohibits us from offering leavened products or honey
on the altar. Sefer HaChinuch –
following the position of Maimonides – maintains that both of these
prohibitions are included in a single commandment. He notes that Nachmanides disagrees and maintains that each
substance – honey and leavened products – is the subject of its own
commandment.
Sefer HaChinuch notes that there is not an obvious
reason for these prohibitions.
Furthermore, he notes that there is barely a hint or allusion to a
reason in the traditional texts. He
explains that he feels he must nonetheless offer a hypothesis. He then proceeds to offer a number of
plausible but unproven explanations.[1]
In this instance, Sefer HaChinuch raises the issue
outlined above. If the Torah does not
provide an explanation for the commandment, and there is no clear indication of
its rationale in the traditional sources, then why speculate? Why not just allow the mystery of the
commandment’s reason to remain unsolved and recognize the limits of our
knowledge?
In order to understand Sefer HaChinuch’s answer we
must be aware of the audience for whom the work is designed. In the introduction, the author of Sefer
HaChinuch explains that one of his objectives in writing this work is to teach
the youth. He hopes that young students
will read the work and learn the mitzvot and the basic laws of each
commandment.
Sefer HaChinuch explains that because the work is
designed to serve the young student, it is important to provide a rationale for
each commandment. The author explains
that he wishes to strengthen a student’s appreciation for the wisdom of the
Torah and the benefits of the Torah life.
In time, as his intellectual powers grow and mature, the student will
come to appreciate the wisdom of the Torah expressed in the intricate system of
halachah. The young student is not
ready for this in-depth and often abstract analysis of halachah, but the young
student can appreciate the wisdom expressed in the rationale for the
commandment. Providing a rationale for
each commandment provides the student with a tangible and accessible example of
the Torah’s wisdom and the benefits of the Torah life.
Furthermore, Sefer HaChinuch suggests that not
providing a rationale for each commandment is potentially harmful. If the probing student is told that there is
no reason for a commandment – or that the reason is not knowable – he may
conclude that the Torah is not accessible.
He will lose interest and will conclude that there is little reason to
devote his time and energy to studying a subject that cannot be understood.[2] This may be an erroneous and childish
conclusion, but children tend to be childish.
Many modern-day Torah educators would disagree with
Sefer HaChinuch’s analysis and conclusions.
There are two common objections raised to Sefer HaChinuch’s
position. First, presenting reasons for
commandments can be understood by the student to imply that our obligation to
observe the commandment is somehow linked to its “rationality”. The student may conclude that we are
required to keep the commandment because it is intellectually compelling and
beneficial. This is a faulty
conclusion. Furthermore, it can easily
lead to the student’s abandonment of observance. If the student begins to question the reasons for the
commandments and rejects these explanations, then he has no reason to feel
compelled to observe these meaningless directives.
Second, it is important that we impress upon our
children the importance of obedience to the Torah. By providing a reason we compromise this lesson. Obedience means following instructions
regardless of one’s assessment of the personal benefit derived from
compliance. When reasons are provided
for commandments, observance becomes more an expression of self-interest and
less an expression of steadfast commitment.
Obviously, Sefer HaChinuch rejects these
considerations. It is important to
understand his position. If we
carefully consider Sefer HaChinuch’s position, it is clear that the primary
focus in teaching children is to recognize what will appeal to, or discourage,
a child and to use this knowledge to assure that the learning experience is
rich and exciting.
This focus is more evident when we compare his
position to that of the more modern educators described above. These educators make two assumptions. First, they assume that the young student will
not understand the distinction between appreciating the wisdom and benefit of a
commandment and believing that this rationale is the reason for personal
observance of the commandment. Children
can grasp this concept. They can
understand that we can appreciate the wisdom of the Torah through recognizing
the rationale for commandments. They
will not confuse this objective with the conclusion that the rationale for a
commandment is the reason for its observance.
Second, these educators assume that from an early
age, obedience to the Torah must supersede appreciation and love of the
Torah. They sense that there is a
potential contradiction between obedience and appreciation of the Torah. They assume that the child need not love the
Torah or appreciate it in order to be obedient to its commandments.
Both of the assumptions suggest a perspective on the
outlook and thinking of the young student.
It is true that our obedience to the Torah should not be dependent upon
our assessment of personal gain through observance. However, this is a remarkably mature attitude that even most
adults never achieve. To deprive our
children of the opportunity to appreciate the beauty of Torah in order to
attempt to instill in them the loftiest mode of observance is not in the best
interest of the students. The student
must be taught in a manner that is consistent with his developmental stage and
intellectual maturity. He cannot be
addressed and treated as a mature adult.
Second, it is true that some individuals who abandon Torah
observance will rationalize their decision by criticizing the rational for
various mitzvot. However, it is
unlikely that these questions and criticisms are the source of their crisis of
faith. Instead, these issues are
elicited as a justification for their abandonment of the Torah. It is not reasonable to assume that the young
student will experience a similar crisis simply because his teacher provided a
rational for the mitzvot and explained their benefit.
In short, Sefer HaChinuch’s message is that our
approach to education must be age appropriate.
Children are not adults. We must
be careful to teach our children in a manner that is developmentally
appropriate.
[1] Maimonides (Moreh Nevuchim 3,29 and 3,46) explains that it was the common practice among idolators to offer sacrifices of leaved bread or sweats. The Torah prohibits offering these substances in order to differentiate our offerings from those of the idolators. From Maimonides’ perspective, there is no reason for the Torah to provide an explanation for this commandment. Those who received it were familiar with the pagan practices. To them, the rational and objective of the commandment would have been self-evident. This will also apply to other commandments designed to banish idolatry and pagan practices. We are not familiar with these practices. To us the commandments seem arbitrary and without clear purpose. However, to the generation to whom the Torah was given, the rational was clear.
[2] Rav Aharon HaLeyve, Sefer HaChinuch, Mitzvah 117.