“And you shall count for you from the morrow after
the day of rest, from the day that you brought the sheaf of the waving seven
weeks. They shall be complete.” (VaYikra 23:15)
We are currently involved in the mitzvah of sefirat
ho’omer – the counting of the omer. We
begin counting the omer on the second night of Pesach and continue the process
up to Shavuot. This mitzvah requires
that each night we verbally identify the new day’s number within the fifty days
of the omer. On the second night of
Pesach we declare that we are in the first day of the omer. We declare the following night as the second
day of the omer. We repeat this
process nightly until we arrive at Shavuot.
The first mention of this mitzvah in the Torah is found in our passage.
Sefer HaChinuch provides an explanation for this
mitzvah. He explains that the
fundamental purpose of this mitzvah is to link Pesach with Shavuot. Why is it important to make this
connection? Pesach recalls and
celebrates our redemption from Egypt.
However, this celebration is only completed with Shavuot. Shavuot recalls and celebrates the
revelation of the Torah at Sinai. Our
redemption from Egypt was designed to prepare us for this receiving the
Torah. This was the purpose and sole
objective of our redemption from Egypt.
Without the Torah our redemption would have been meaningless. Therefore, we are required to acknowledge
that the redemption that we celebrate on Pesach was – in itself – an incomplete
event. It was a step in the progression
towards revelation. We acknowledge this
concept by linking – through our counting – the redemption of Pesach with the
revelation of Shavuot.[1]
In our times, this remains an important
message. Pesach is the most widely
celebrated Jewish festival or annual event.
It would seem that this popularity stems from its theme. The theme of an oppressed people achieving
freedom from torment and bondage has broad appeal. This theme resonates with humanistic, enlightened values. However, it is unfortunate that this
perceived theme of Pesach is not the actual message of the festival. We are not celebrating freedom in
itself. Freedom is significant because
of the opportunities that it provides.
The virtue of freedom lies in the choices made by the free, unfettered
individual or people. Freedom can be
used wisely or destructively. We
celebrate our freedom because of the opportunity that it provides us to serve
Hashem. If this element is absent from
the Pesach celebration, the festival has been fundamentally altered from the
Torah’s design.
This observation is not intended to suggest that we
should not be gratified by the widespread celebration of Pesach. Instead, this observation should indicate to
us that much work must still be done to communicate to the wider Jewish world
the full meaning of Pesach.
The counting of the omer is an individual
obligation. Each person fulfills this
obligation through his individual verbal declaration of the number of the
day. This raises an interesting
question. The question requires a short
introduction. There are many Torah
obligations that are fulfilled through verbal pronouncements. For example, each Shabbat night we are
required to individually recite Kiddush.
However, it is not the common practice for each member of the household
to recite Kiddush. Instead, the head of
the household recites Kiddush for the other member of the household and
guests. How does the Kiddush recited by
the head of the household fulfill the individual obligation of the others present? The answer is that the others present
fulfill their obligation through the legal principle of shomeah ka’oneh – one
who listens is equated with the one who verbalizes. According to this principle, a person who listens to a verbal
pronouncement is considered to have actually made the pronouncement. There are two important conditions that must
be met for this principle to be applied.
First, the person who wishes to fulfill his obligation with someone
else’s pronouncement must listen attentively.
Second, both parties must share the intention to fulfill the listener’s
obligation through the other party’s verbal pronouncement.
With this background, the question can be
introduced. Can the principle of
shomeah ka’oneh be applied to the counting of the omer? In other words, can a person fulfill his
personal obligation to count the omer through listening to another person
count?
One would expect that the principle does apply. After all, why should counting of the omer
be different from reciting Kiddush? If
a person can fulfill one’s obligation to recite Kiddush through listening to
someone else, it is reasonable to assume that one can fulfill the obligation to
count the omer in the same manner. This
is the position of Rav Yosef Karo.[2]
Others disagree.
Magen Avraham suggests that the principle of shomeah ka’oneh cannot be
applied to the mitzvah of counting the omer.
He offers an interesting explanation for his position. This explanation is based upon the Talmud’s
analysis of our passage. The passage
instructs that “you shall count (the omer) for you.” What is the meaning of the seemingly superfluous phrase “for
you”? The Talmud explains that this
phrase teaches us that each person must count.[3] Tosefot comment that the Talmud
distinguishes between the counting of the omer and the counting of the fifty
years from one Jubilee to the next. The
counting of the years between Jubilees is performed by the Sanhedrin – the high
court. There is no obligation upon
individuals to conduct this counting.
In contrast, the mitzvah of counting the omer is not placed upon the
Sanhedrin. In this instance, the
individual is required to perform the counting.[4] Magen Avraham explains that because the
Talmud concludes that the obligation to count the omer is placed upon each
individual, the principle of shomeah ka’oneh cannot be applied. Application of this principle would result
in one person counting on behalf of many other individuals.[5]
Magen Avraham’s comments are difficult to
understand. It is unlikely that the message
of the Talmud is that the Torah wishes to establish a proliferation of
counters! The more reasonable
interpretation of the Talmud’s message is that the obligation of counting the
omer should not be confused with the counting of the years between Jubilees. The counting of the omer is a personal
obligation and not an obligation upon the Sanhedrin. Then, the counting of the omer can be equated with obligation to
recite Kiddush. Both are personal
obligations. Yet, the principle of
shomeah ka’oneh does apply to Kiddush.
Why should this principle not apply to the counting of the omer?
Magen Avraham provides an important hint to his
reasoning in his discussion of another issue.
Can a person count the omer in a language that he does not
understand? Magen Avraham discusses
this issue in regards to the obligation to recite the Shema. He explains that the Shema can be recited in
any language with the single provision that the person understands the
language.[6] He adds that this ruling also applies to Kiddush,
prayer, and the reciting of blessings.
The implication of this ruling is that if a person recites the Shema in
Hebrew, it is not necessary for the person to understand the language. Mishne Berurah confirms this interpretation.[7]
We would expect this ruling to apply to the counting
of the omer. In other words, if a
person counts the omer in Hebrew without understanding the language, one
fulfills the obligation. However, this
is not Magen Avraham’s position. In the
case of counting the omer, Magen Avraham rules that the person must understand
the meaning of his statement. A person
can only count in Hebrew if he understands the meaning of his words.[8] Why is the counting of the omer an exception
to the general rule regarding Hebrew?
Why in this instance is Hebrew only acceptable if the person counting
understands the language?
Let us begin with this last question. It seems that Magen Avraham is concerned
with a basic issue regarding the mitzvah of counting the omer. Is this mitzvah fulfilled merely by
pronouncing the appropriately formulated declaration on each night or must a
person actually engage in a conscious act of counting? If we assume that the obligation is
fulfilled through the pronouncement of the properly formulated declaration,
then one should be permitted to count in Hebrew regardless of one’s mastery of
the language. After all, the
appropriate formula has been pronounced.
The obligation is fulfilled.
Magen Avraham rejects this interpretation of the mitzvah. His understanding of the mitzvah is that one
must engage in a conscious act of counting.
If one does not understand the meaning of the formula that he
pronounces, then one has not fulfilled his obligation. In this respect, counting of the omer
differs from the obligation to recite the Shema and other similar
obligations. In these instances, one
fulfills the minimal obligation through properly reciting the required
statement. Of course, the mitzvah is
performed on a more meaningful level when one understands the meaning of his
statement. But on a minimal level, this
is not required to fulfill the obligation.
We can not return to our original question. According to Magen Avraham, why does the
principle of shomeah ka’oneh not apply to the counting of the omer? Magen Avraham is suggesting that this
principle has a significant limitation.
What is precisely accomplished though shomeah ka’oneh? This principle provides a means through
which one person’s pronouncement can be applied to another person’s obligation
to make this pronouncement. Again, let
us consider the example of Kiddush.
Through shomeah ka’oneh one person can recite Kiddush and this
recitation can be related to and fulfill the obligation of all others who
listen attentively.
However, according to Magen Avraham, the obligation
of counting the omer is not fulfilled through producing a properly formulated
pronouncement. Instead, each individual
is required to engage in a conscious act of counting. The principle of shomeah ka’oneh cannot be applied to this
obligation. One does not become a
“counter” through shomeah ka’oneh.
A simple analogy will help illustrate this
distinction. An organization sponsors a
“walkathon”. Supporters of the
organization can participate in two ways.
They can walk or they can sponsor a walker. The sponsor pledges a donation to the organization for every mile
that the sponsored walker completes. On
the day of the walkathon, the walkers and sponsors converge on the site of the
event. The walkers embark on their walk
and the sponsors stand on the sidelines.
The sponsors are participating.
They deeply identify with the walkers they have sponsored and feel very
proud of their support for their walkers.
At the end of the event, a medical team checks the health of each
walker. All of the walkers have
elevated heart rates. They have enjoyed
the cardiovascular benefits of the event.
One of the sponsors asks a member of the medical team to check his heart
rate. Should he expect to have enjoyed
the same health benefits that the walkers have experienced? Of course not! He can take pride in his participation in the event. But he did not actually walk!
The principle of shomeah ka’oneh presents a similar
phenomenon. The listener has
participated. Through his
participation, he fulfills his obligation.
But he cannot be viewed as performing a conscious act of counting. Therefore in the instance of counting the
omer, shomeah ka’oneh cannot be applied.
[1] Rav Aharon HaLeyve, Sefer HaChinuch, Mitzvah 306.
[2] RavYosef Karo, Bait Yosef Commentary on Tur, Orach Chayim 489.
[3] Mesechet Menachot 65b.
[4] Tosefot, Mesechet Menachot 65b.
[5] Rav Avraham Avlee, Magen Avraham Commentary on Shulchan Aruch, Orech Chayim 489:1.
[6] Rav Avraham Avlee, Magen Avraham Commentary on Shulchan Aruch, Orech Chayim 62:2.
[7] Rav Yisrael Meir Kagan, Mishne Berurah, 62:2.
[8] Rav Avraham Avlee, Magen Avraham Commentary on Shulchan Aruch, Orech Chayim 62:2.