“And you should collect
all its spoil into the midst of its open square, and burn with fire the city
and all its spoil, completely, for Hashem, your G-d. And it shall be a heap of destruction forever, never to be rebuilt. And nothing that is doomed to destruction
shall cling to your hand, so that the Lord may return from His fierce wrath,
and grant you compassion, and be compassionate with you, and multiply you, as
He swore to your forefathers.” (Devarim
13:17-18.)
Maimonides explains that each of the taryag mitzvot – the 613 commandments -- is distinct. Therefore, although a prohibition or obligation may be reiterated a number of times in the Torah, it is only regarded as a single commandment among the 613 mitzvot. In other words, the activities or behaviors that are required or prohibited by each commandment are unique; multiple commandments do not reiterate – either requiring or prohibiting – the same activity or behavior.[1]
Nonetheless, it is possible
for a person to violate multiple commandments with a single action.[2]
For example, if a person cooks meat with milk on Shabbat, he violates two
mitzvot. He violates the mitzvah
prohibiting melachah – creative activity – on Shabbat. One of the activities defined as melachah is
cooking. The person also violates the
mitzvah prohibiting the cooking together of meat and milk. The person only performed a single act. However, this activity is prohibited by two
distinct commandments. Therefore, both
mitzvot are violated.
This example does not
contradict Maimonides’ rule regarding mitzvot.
The mitzvah prohibiting the performance of melachah on Shabbat is
certainly distinct from the mitzvah prohibiting cooking together milk and meat. In our example a single act was performed;
however, different characteristics within this action generate the multiple
violations. One characteristic of the
action is that it is a melachah. The
second characteristic is that meat and milk are cooked together.
Maimonides’ basic principle
is intuitively reasonable. We would
expect the 613 mitzvot to be distinct from one another. However, Maimonides extends and applies his
principle in ways that are not self-evident.
The Torah prohibits the consumption of various species. Among these
species are those defined as sheretz.
The exact definition of this category requires an extensive
discussion. For this discussion, we
will loosely describe the term to refer to insects. Different mitzvot prohibit flying insects, crawling insects and
various other general categories of insects.
However, there is no specific mitzvah that prohibits aquatic
insects. Instead, there is a general
mitzvah that states that all insects are prohibited. Maimonides explains that this mitzvah prohibits consumption of
aquatic insects.[3]
Maimonides raises a
question. If a person consumes a flying
insect, how many mitzvot does the person violate? It would seem that the person violates two mitzvot: the mitzvah prohibiting
consumption of flying insects and general prohibition against consumption of
insects. However, Maimonides explains
that this is not the correct conclusion.
His explanation is somewhat vague.
It seems he maintains that the person only violates the mitzvah against
consumption of flying insects. The
general mitzvah against consuming insects is not violated. The general commandment only prohibits the
consumption of aquatic insects.
Maimonides acknowledges that this general commandment does not make a
specific reference to aquatic insects and these aquatic insects are only
included in this mitzvah because the commandment legislates a general
commandment against the consumption of insects. Nonetheless, he seems to maintain that any insects that are
prohibited by another mitzvah are not prohibited by the general commandment.[4]
Why does the general
commandment not include all insects? It
is a general statement prohibiting all insects! Why does Maimonides insist that this general mitzvah is only applicable
to aquatic insects? Maimonides explains
that his position is an expression and application of the principle outlined
above. Each mitzvah is unique. Furthermore, the particular and specific
characteristics of any activity can only be prohibited by a single
commandment. Flying insects are
prohibited by a specific mitzvah. It is
not possible for these insects to also be prohibited by the general prohibition
against the consumption of insects. If
these insects were prohibited by the general mitzvah, then the specific
characteristics of the organism would be prohibited by multiple mitzvot. This is a violation of the principle
outlined above.[5] In short, Maimonides position has two
aspects. First, each mitzvah is
distinct and unique. Second, the
specific characteristics, or properties, of any object or activity can only be
a prohibited by a single mitzvah.
In our parasha we encounter
an instance in which Maimonides seems to violate this principle. The passages above describe the laws of an
eir ha’nidachat. This is a city in which
the inhabitants have adopted idolatry.
The guilty inhabitants of the city are executed and the city and its
contents are destroyed. Furthermore,
the Torah prohibits anyone from taking anything from this city. Nothing may be rescued from
destruction. Maimonides explains that
the prohibition against taking anything from the city is a mitzvah. Specifically, it is violated if a person
derives benefit from any object in the city that is required to be destroyed.[6] Maimonides explains that this prohibition is
not limited to the objects in an eir ha’nidachat. It extends to any object associated with idolatry that is
required to be destroyed. For example,
the Torah commands us to destroy trees associated with idolatry. If a person uses the wood of such a tree for
cooking this mitzvah is violated.[7]
“And you should not bring an abomination into your house, lest you be are to be destroyed like it, but you shall utterly detest it, and you shall utterly abhor it; for it is to be destroyed.” (Devarim 7:26)
The above passages are found
in last week’s parasha – Parshat Ekev.
The parasha discusses the mitzvah to destroy objects associated with
idolatry. The passage above communicates a prohibition against deriving benefit
from these objects. Is this prohibition
a separate mitzvah or is it included in the mitzvah prohibiting a person from
deriving benefit from an eir ha’nidachat and other objects associated with
idolatry? We would assume that
Maimonides would respond that there is a mitzvah that prohibits deriving
benefit from an object from an eir ha’nidachat. This mitzvah also includes a prohibition against deriving benefit
from any object associated with idolatry.
Therefore, there cannot be a second commandment that specifically
prohibits deriving benefit from an object associated with idolatry. The second mitzvah would not be unique. It would prohibit an activity already the
subject of another mitzvah.
Nonetheless, Maimonides asserts that there is a second mitzvah. He explains that our parasha communicates a
mitzvah prohibiting deriving benefit from an object of an eir ha’nidachat. He extends this mitzvah to include any
object associated with idolatry. But,
he also maintains that the above passages from Parshat Ekev communicate a
second mitzvah that prohibits deriving benefit from an object associated with
idolatry.[8]
Various commentaries on
Maimonides deal with this issue. They
argue that the two commandments are really very different. The commandment in our parasha does prohibit
benefit. According to these
commentaries, the mitzvah in Parshat Ekev does not prohibit benefit. It prohibits bringing an object associated
with idolatry into one’s home.[9] However, there is no clear indication in
Maimonides’ writings that he accepts this distinction. Furthermore, his treatment of these two
mitzvot in his code of law – Mishne Torah – clearly indicates that he regards
both mitzvot as prohibitions against deriving benefit from these objects.[10]
In order to understand
Maimonides’ position, it is necessary to further consider his treatment of
these two mitzvot: the mitzvah
prohibiting benefiting from the objects of an eir ha’nidachat or other objects
associated with idolatry, and the mitzvah prohibiting benefiting from objects
associated with idolatry. In his Mishne
Torah Maimonides explains that we are obligated to completely destroy the eir
ha’nidachat and all of the property of the city. He immediately follows this statement with a delineation of the
mitzvah to not benefit from the objects of an eir ha’nidachat.[11] It seems from this context that according to
Maimonides, the mitzvah prohibiting benefiting from these objects is an
extension of the obligation to destroy the city and its contents. By taking the object and benefiting from it,
the object is rescued from destruction. The requirement to completely destroy
the city and its contents is abrogated.
Although the mitzvah is not violated until the person benefits from the
object, the fundamental element of the mitzvah is to not interfere with the
destruction of the city and its contents.
Similarly, this mitzvah extends to all objects that are associated with
idolatry. The Torah requires us to
destroy these objects. Taking these
objects and benefiting from them is an abrogation of the requirement to destroy
them. This understanding to the mitzvah
is conforms to the simple message of the passages in which it is outlined.
In his Sefer HaMitzvot,
Maimonides discusses the mitzvah requiring us to destroy all objects associated
with idolatry. It is important to note
that after describing the mitzvah Maimonides adds that rather than benefiting
from these objects we are required to reject and regard as abominations all
objects associated with idolatry.[12] Apparently, Maimonides adds this comment in
order to explain the fundamental concept underlying the commandment. We are prohibited from benefiting from
objects associated with idolatry because we should regard these objects with
disgust. If we benefit from the object,
we fail to demonstrate the proper and required attitude towards idolatry. This interpretation of the mitzvah is
apparent in the above passage.
In short, although these two mitzvot – the mitzvah prohibiting benefiting from the objects of an eir ha’nidachat or other objects associated with idolatry and the mitzvah prohibiting benefiting from objects associated with idolatry – prohibit the physical identical activity. However, the mitzvot focus on different halachic characteristics within the activity. The mitzvah prohibiting benefiting from the contents of an eir ha’nidachat is a prohibition against interfering with the requirement to destroy the city and its contents. The mitzvah prohibiting benefiting from objects associated with idolatry is an expression of the requirement to adopt an attitude of disgust with idolatry. Therefore, Maimonides’ treatment of these two prohibitions as separate mitzvot is not inconsistent with his general principle.
[1] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Sefer HaMitzvot, Principle 9.
[2] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Mishne Torah, Hilchot Shegagot 4.
[3] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Sefer HaMitzvot, Mitzvat Lo Ta’aseh 179.
[4] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Sefer HaMitzvot, Mitzvat Lo Ta’aseh 179.
[5] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Sefer HaMitzvot, Mitzvat Lo Ta’aseh 179.
[6] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Sefer HaMitzvot, Mitzvat Lo Ta’aseh 24.
[7] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Sefer HaMitzvot, Mitzvat Lo Ta’aseh 25.
[8] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Sefer HaMitzvot, Mitzvat Lo Ta’aseh 25.
[9] Rabbaynu Yitzchak DeLeon, Meggilat Esther, Commentary on Maimonides’ Sefer Hamitzvot, Principle 9.
[10] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Mishne Torah, Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 4:7, 7:2.
[11] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Mishne Torah, Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 4:6-7.
[12] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Sefer HaMitzvot, Mitzvat Lo Ta’aseh 25.