Justice as a Characteristic of the Land of Israel
You should appoint judges and officers in all of the gates that Hashem
will give to your tribes. And they shall administer an honest judgment for the
nation. (Devarim 16:18)
This pasuk introduces the first section of the parasha. This section
discusses the appointment of judges and the administration of justice. The courts are a fundamental Torah
institution. The Torah includes
religious and civil law. It is the role of the courts to decide legal questions
and to resolve civil conflicts between litigants.
The above passage instructs
us to appoint judges for each “gate”.
The term “gate” refers to a city.
In other words, the pasuk
directs us to place a court in every city.
Maimonides discusses this obligation in his Mishne Torah. He explains that we are required to place a
court in every city and in every district.
However, this requirement only applies in the Land of Israel.[1] This raises an obvious question. Courts are also required when Bnai Yisrael
are in exile. In exile, legal questions
arise and disputes occur and these issues are to be decided by a Torah
court. In the Land of Israel, we are
required to establish an extensive court system. How extensive a court system is required in exile? Maimonides does not explicitly address this
issue. His silence on this issue
implies that the answer should be obvious.
What is this obvious answer?
As we have explained, the
function of the courts is to resolve legal questions and disputes. Apparently, Maimonides maintains that this
function determines the form of the court system in exile. The system must be sufficient to serve this
function. In some countries of our
exile, Jews have concentrated in a few cities.
These cities require courts.
Other cities that do not have significant Jewish communities do not
require their own courts. In other
countries, we have settled across the breadth of the Land. In such countries, a more extensive court
system is required. The magnitude of
the system is determined by function.
The court system must be adequate to serve its function. We can now understand Maimonides’ reason for
not discussing the specific perimeters of the court system in exile. There are no specific perimeters. The system must be adequate to function.
This suggests a
problem. The system of courts in the
Land of Israel is very different from the system in exile. In exile, the number of courts required in
any country is determined by practical considerations. Specifically, the number must be adequate to
serve the population. This is not the
requirement regarding the Land of Israel.
The Torah requires that the court system of the Land of Israel extend to
every district and city. This implies
that the placement of courts in the Land of Israel is not determined solely by
function. In other words, even in an
instance in which two cities are in close proximity of one another and their
combined population could easily be served a single court, each city requires
its own court. Maimonides explains that
in the Land of Israel, a community with 120 males must have its own court.[2] Clearly, justice would not suffer through
consolidating a number of small communities and appointing a single court for
this consolidated group! Why is this
plethora of courts required in the Land of Israel?
In order to answer this
question, it is helpful to consider an interesting passage in our parasha. In the midst of the discussion of the courts, the Torah inserts
an important pasuk. The Torah instructs us to pursue justice
vigorously. This persistent commitment
to justice assures that we will possess the Land that Hashem has given us.[3] This passage makes an unequivocal connection
between the operation of the courts and our right to the Land of Israel. Our right to live in the Land is contingent
on our pursuit of justice. Failure to
institute a system of justice results in a forfeiture of our right to the
Land. This relationship can be
explained on two levels. On the simple
level, the Torah is telling us that we cannot define our service to Hashem
through religious devotion alone. A Jew
that defines observance exclusively through ritual is not Torah observant. Torah observance requires adherence to the
religious and civil law. The Torah is
giving us a warning. If we limit our
observance to the ritual law, we are not living according to the percepts of
the Torah. This disregard of the Torah
will be punished by exile.
The pasuk also has a deeper meaning.
In order to identify this meaning, we must understand an important
concept. The Land of Israel is endowed
with sanctity. Other lands do not have
sanctity. What is the meaning of
sanctity in this context? What makes
the Land of Israel sacred? The sanctity
is a consequence of the special laws that apply to the Land. There are many mitzvot that apply exclusively to the Land of Israel. We give tithes from the produce of the
Land. We observe the Sabbatical and
Jubilee years in the Land of Israel.
The many mitzvot that apply
exclusively to the Land of Israel endow the land with a special sanctity. There are no special laws attached to any
other land. Therefore, other lands are
not endowed with sanctity.
One of the mitzvot that is unique to the Land of
Israel is the court system. In the Land
of Israel, the courts are not merely the administrator of justice. The courts create a relationship between
justice and the Land; they endow the Land with the characteristic of being a land
of justice. Let us contrast the
courts of the Land of Israel with the courts in exile. In exile, there is no relationship between
the courts and the land. The courts
administer justice. The courts are not
an aspect or reflection of the unique nature of the country. In contrast, the courts in the Land of
Israel are not merely the instrument of justice. The Land of Israel must be associated with justice to the extent
that justice is a characteristic of the land.
A connection must be made between the land and justice. How is this connection created? It is created through the placement of a
court in every city and district.
We can now understand the
deeper meaning of the passage. The pasuk informs us that possession of the
Land is contingent upon the administration of justice. This is because possession of the Land is
dependent upon respecting its sanctity.
The court system and justice are an expression of this sanctity. Failure to act with justice demonstrates
disregard for the Land’s sanctity.
Therefore, it is punished with exile.
The Authority of the Prophet and the Authority of the Scholar
Hashem your G-d will appoint for you a prophet, like me, from among
you. You should obey him. (Devarim 18:15)
This pasuk introduces the Torah’s discussion of prophets. The Torah explains that Hashem will appoint
prophets after Moshe. These prophets
will provide leadership and guidance.
We are commanded to obey these prophets.
This passage has a second
meaning. This message is explained by
Rav Yitzchak Zev Soloveitchik Zt”l. Rav Soloveitchik was brought the manuscript
of a sefer – a book – to review. The
author sought Rav Soloveitchik’s critique of his work. Rav Soloveitchik reviewed the manuscript and
after this review told the author that one specific statement should be removed
from the text. The manuscript contained
a comment attributed to Rav Soloveitchik’s father – Rav Chaim Zt’l.
Rav Chaim was quoted as praising the scholarship of Rav Diskin. Rav Chaim said that Rav Diskin’s scholarship
was superlative and that the Torah’s injunction, “You should obey him” could be
applied to Rav Diskin. Rav Soloveitchik
asserted that this statement simply was not true and should not be attributed
to his father. This command cannot be
applied to Rav Diskin or any scholar.
This injunction is derived from our passage. We are commanded to obey the prophet. Rav Soloveitchik explained that the passage has two
meanings. First, we must obey the
prophet. Second, this level of
obedience is not given to any other person.
Only the prophet has the right to demand complete obedience. Therefore, the passage cannot be applied to
Rav Diskin. This is not because of any
inadequacy in Rav Diskin. This is
because the passage stipulates that only a proven prophet can demand this
obedience. Rav Diskin was a great
scholar. However, we no longer have
true prophets.[4]
Rav Soloveitchik’s comments
require some interpretation. We are
required to be obedient towards Torah scholars. These scholars, through their courts, have the right to interpret
the law. Our scholars may institute new
laws. We are commanded to obey their
decisions. How does this obedience
differ from the obedience reserved for the prophet?
Perhaps, Rav Soloveitchik
was alluding to a basic difference. The
Torah assigns to its scholars the authority to interpret and apply its legal
principles. We are required to be
obedient to the Torah as it is interpreted by the scholars. Our obedience is not to the individual scholar,
but to his office and authority as the legitimate arbitrator of the meaning and
intent of the Torah’s laws. In
contrast, the prophet’s words are treated as the message of Hashem. This status is reserved exclusively for the
prophet. Therefore, our obligation to
obey the scholar is limited to his area of authority – the interpretation of
the law. The prophet’s authority is not
limited. We are required to obey his
commands in regards to any and every issue.
We can now more fully understand Rav Soloveitchik’s objection. Rav Diskin was a great scholar. His opinions deserve careful consideration. His outstanding wisdom and knowledge must be respected. In many instances, his legal decision deserves absolute obedience. However, we cannot accord him the obedience and deference reserved for the prophet.