“I am Hashem, your God, Who took you out of the land
of Egypt, out of the house of bondage.” (Shemot 20:2)
This
week’s parasha includes the Decalogue.
The above passage is the first pasuk of the Decalogue. According to Sefer HaChinuch, this passage
is the source of the commandment to accept that Hashem exists. He explains that this commandment requires
that we respond to any inquiry regarding our convictions that we wholeheartedly
accept the existence of Hashem. He adds
that we are required to relinquish our lives for the sake of this
conviction. In other words, we must
affirm our conviction in the existence of Hashem and that there is no other is
G-d. We are even required to sacrifice
our lives in affirmation of this conviction.
Sefer
HaChinuch adds that we should strive to establish clear proof of Hashem’s
existence. If we succeed in
establishing such proof, then we have fulfilled the mitzvah at its
highest level.[1] This is a
troubling statement. It is
understandable that complete fulfillment of the commandment requires basing our
conviction on objective evidence.
However, the implication of this statement is that even if we do not
base our conviction on any evidence, the commandment has been fulfilled at
least at to a minimal standard.
This
implication presents two problems.
First, Sefer HaChinuch acknowledges that conviction in the existence of
G-d is the most fundamental element of Torah Judaism. All other elements of the Torah are based on this conviction.[2] If this
conviction is not based upon evidence, then one’s entire adherence to the Torah
and one’s observance of the commandments is based upon a solely subjective
belief. Among the Torah’s commandments
are various mitzvot that presume that the Torah is true and that other
faiths are not valid. For example, the
Torah includes many commandments directed against idolatry. These commandments include directives to
execute idolaters. If our conviction in
the Torah is based upon a completely subjective set of beliefs, then these
beliefs are no more credible than those of the idolater. The Torah describes Hashem as a just
G-d. How can a just G-d command us to
execute those whose beliefs – although different from ours – are every bit as
credible?
Second,
the implication that conviction in Hashem’s existence based on subjective
belief is adequate contradicts the position outlined by Sefer HaChinuch in his
introduction to his work. There, the
author explains that one of the unique elements of the Torah is the Sinai
revelation described in this week’s parasha. The Torah was revealed by Hashem to the entire nation. All of the people heard Hashem address the
nation. The objective of mass revelation
was to establish a firm basis for future generations’ acceptance of the
authenticity of the Torah as a G-d-given creed.
The
details of Sefer HaChinuch’s argument are beyond the scope of this discussion,
but it is sufficient for our purposes to summarize his thinking. Mass revelation endows the giving of the
Torah with the standing of an objective historical event. In other words, the Torah’s account of
revelation as a mass event is so fantastic that the very acceptance of this
claim indicates that it cannot be reasonably assumed to be a fabrication. No generation would have agreed to be the
first to accept this fantastic claim were it not part of its historical record.
According
to Sefer HaChinuch, the objective of the Sinai revelation was to create a firm,
objective basis for the authenticity of the Torah as a G-d-given truth. It is odd that, according to Sefer
HaChinuch, Hashem gave the Torah through the Sinai revelation to provide an objective basis for our conviction in
its authenticity – yet a subjective
belief in Hashem’s existence is acceptable!
Let
us consider another issue. Conviction
in the existence of G-d is, in itself, a meaningless requirement. Such a requirement lacks any description of
the specifics of the required conviction.
In other words, what is meant by “G-d”?
Without a response to this question, the requirement is too vague to be
meaningful. Sefer HaChinuch delineates
three elements to the mitzvah:
1) We are required to accept the existence of a G-d Who is the source of
all that exists; 2) This G-d is eternal; 3) This G-d redeemed us from Egypt and
gave us the Torah.[3] These
elements provide the specific details that give meaning to the requirement to
accept the existence of Hashem.
Generally,
Sefer HaChinuch adopts the position of Maimonides. However, there seems to be a disagreement between these
authorities regarding the specifics of the meaning
of acceptance of Hashem. In his Sefer
HaMitzvot, Maimonides defines the commandment to accept the existence of G-d as
a requirement to acknowledge there is a G-d Who is the cause of all that
exists. [4] He does not include within the mitzvah a
requirement to acknowledge Hashem as the G-d Who redeemed us from Egypt and
gave us the Torah.[5]
Rabbaynu
Yehudah HaLeyve also deals with the requirement to accept that Hashem exists.
His position is very different from that of Maimonides. He explains that we are required to accept
the existence of a G-d Who redeemed us from Egypt and gave us the Torah. He does not
include within this basic requirement that we accept Hashem as the
creator. He explains that while the
Torah requires that we accept the existence of Hashem, this requirement does
not include acknowledgement that He is the creator. There is a compelling reason for the requirement’s exclusion of
this element. Proof of a G-d Who is
creator of the universe can only be attained through philosophical and
scientific investigation and speculation.
These investigations – and any proofs they provide of a creator – are
subject to debate and criticism.
According to Rabbaynu Yehudah HaLeyve, the Torah does not wish to base
acceptance of Hashem upon speculations and investigations that can be debated
and are not accessible to the average person.
Instead, the Torah instructs us to base our acceptance of Hashem upon
historically credible, public events and the Sinai revelation.[6]
It
is important to note the Rabbaynu Yehudah HaLeyve does not intend to imply that
acceptance of Hashem as creator is not a fundamental element of the Torah. This would be a rejection of the opening
chapters of the Torah. The position of
Rabbaynu Yehudah HaLeyve is explained by Rabbaynu Nissim Gerondi in his
commentary on the Torah. He explains
that acceptance of Hashem as the creator of the universe is an essential
element of the Torah. However, this is
a truth we know through revelation. The
requirement to accept Hashem focuses on accepting Him as our redeemer from
Egypt and the giver of the Torah. Once
we accept the Torah as a revealed truth, it follows that we must accept the
contents of this revealed truth. An
essential element of this revealed doctrine is that Hashem is creator.[7]
Rabbaynu
Yehudah HaLeyve seems to present a compelling argument for his position. Why does Maimonides insist that the
essential element of the mitzvah to accept Hashem is the recognition
that He is creator? In order to answer
this question, we must address an astounding oddity in Maimonides’ Mishne
Torah. Maimonides’ Mishne Torah is a
codification of Torah law. However, the
third and fourth chapters of this work can be described as a brief summary of
physics and astrophysics. Why is this
material included in this work of Torah law?
Furthermore, as an introduction to each section of this work, Maimonides
provides a list of the commandments that will be described and explained in the
section. Presumably, the material in
the section that follows is an elaboration on the details of these listed
commandments. The first section of the
Mishne Torah is preceded by such an introduction explaining that the section will
deal with ten mitzvot. The list
of these mitzvot includes acceptance of His existence and His
unity. None of the mitzvot in
this list seems to provide an imperative for instruction in and knowledge of
physics or astrophysics. Under which of
these commandments does Maimonides subsume his discussion of physics and
astrophysics?
Maimonides
deals with this issue in the final passages of the fourth chapter. He explains that this discussion is relevant
to those mitzvot that require we accept Hashem’s existence and unity,
and that we adore and hold Him in awe.
How is Maimonides’ discussion of scientific matters relevant to these mitzvot?
According
to Maimonides, acceptance of the existence of Hashem, His unity, and our
adoration and awe of Him must be predicated upon an understanding of our universe
and His centrality to all existence. We
must understand the universe and His role as the source of all existence. It is not adequate to merely accept this
assertion as true. We are required to
understand the nature of the relationship between Hashem and the universe.
An
analogy will help us understand Maimonides’ position. As I record these thoughts I am using my computer. I know that my
computer is composed of a motherboard and various other circuitries. I have no idea how all these elements operate
and work together. I know that these
elements exist. I do not understand
them nor do I have any appreciation of their operations. My acceptance of their existence is
absolute; yet, my understanding of their nature and operation is
negligible. Maimonides maintains that
the requirement that we accept Hashem’s existence cannot be fulfilled simply
through acknowledging the fact He exists.
This acceptance cannot be akin to my acceptance of the existence of a
motherboard and circuitries in my computer.
Instead, my acceptance of Hashem must be akin to the engineer’s more
fundamental comprehension of the computer.
It must include an understanding and an appreciation of the nature of
the universe and Hashem’s role and relationship with reality.
This
is the essential difference in the perspectives of Maimonides and Rabbaynu
Yehudah HaLeyve. According to Rabbaynu
Yehudah HaLeyve, we are required to accept as a revealed truth that Hashem is
creator and that He sustains the universe.
We are not required to understand
or appreciate the full meaning of this assertion. Maimonides rejects this perspective. According to Maimonides, the mitzvah to accept Hashem
requires our appreciation of His relationship to the universe and an
understanding of His centrality to its existence. In other words, this commandment addresses our overall
understanding of reality. We are
required to unmask the nature of the universe and the reality in which we
exist.
We
are now prepared to understand Sefer HaChinuch’s position. Sefer HaChinuch adopts a position that is a
compromise between these two perspectives.
He agrees with Rabbaynu Yehudah HaLeyve that the mitzvah to
accept Hashem requires that we accept Him as our redeemer from Egypt and the
giver of the Torah. He adopts this position
for the reasons that he outlines in the introduction to his work. The Torah must be based on objective
evidence. It cannot be reduced to a set
of subjective beliefs. Mass revelation
and public miracles experienced by our ancestors provide us with the objective
basis for our conviction in Hashem’s existence. We do not need to resort of scientific proof and philosophical
speculation in order to fulfill this most basic commandment.
However,
Sefer HaChinuch is not willing to reject Maimonides’ perspective. Our acceptance of Hashem is not complete
without acknowledgement of His role as creator and sustainer of the
universe. Our acceptance of Hashem must
include this element to be meaningful.
Nonetheless, Sefer HaChinuch does not completely agree with Maimonides’
position. He asserts that although we
should strive to achieve the level of understanding described by Maimonides, it
is not essential to the minimal fulfillment of the mitzvah. However, an understanding of G-d in the
manner explained by Maimonides is the highest fulfillment of the mitzvah.[8]
[1] Rav Aharon HaLeyve, Sefer HaChinuch, Mitzvah 25.
[2] Rav Aharon HaLeyve, Sefer HaChinuch, Mitzvah 25.
[3] Rav Aharon HaLeyve, Sefer HaChinuch, Mitzvah 25.
[4] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Sefer HaMitzvot, Mitzvat Aseh 1
[5] Maimonides also does not include in this description of the mitzvah acceptance of Hashem as eternal. However, in the first chapter of his Mishne Torah, Maimonides elaborates on this mitzvah. There he explains that we are required to accept that Hashem is the cause of all that exists and that His existence is unique. His existence is more “absolute”. This is apparently a reference to the eternity of His existence. In other words, it appears that according to Maimonides, this commandment requires us to accept that only Hashem’s existence is “absolute” or necessary existence. All other things exist as a consequence of His existence and will.
[6] Rabbaynu Yehudah HaLeyve, Kuzari, part I, sections
11-25.
[7] Rabbaynu Nissim ben Reuven Gerondi (Ran), Commentary on Sefer Beresheit 1:1.
[8] It should be noted that none of these authorities ascribe to the position that acceptance of Hashem and the Torah can be founded upon blind faith. To my knowledge, this popular position has no basis or antecedents in the writings of the classical authorities. These authorities were unwilling to equate the Torah to other religions that are based upon personal belief and subjective conviction. Instead, the introduction of blind faith as a basis for acceptance of the Torah seems to be a relatively modern development. Perhaps, this more modern perspective is influenced by modern, conventional theology and existential philosophy.